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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V . 
LANCE MICHAEL WEEKS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: CaseNo.990979-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
On appeal, Defendant Lance Michael Weeks ("Weeks") is challenging the trial 
court's order of restitution in the amount of $9,104.35 on the grounds that the order is 
not based in reliable information, and/or the trial court refused to provide Weeks with a 
"full hearing" on the matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (Supp. 1998). 
(Brief of Appellant at 2.) Specifically, the trial court relied on double-hearsay statements 
in the presentence investigation report to calculate and order the restitution amount. 
Weeks objected to the amount and requested a "full hearing" on the matter in order to 
examine the basis for the award. The trial court denied Weeks' request. 
In response to the challenges on appeal, the state acknowledges that in connection 
with Weeks' request for a "full hearing" on the issue of restitution, the trial court 
conducted a hearing, but took "no evidence" on the matter. (State's Brief of Appellee 
("S.B.") at 9.) The state also does not dispute that the trial court based the restitution 
award on unreliable information. 
However, in urging affirmance on appeal, the state argues that Weeks' objection 
and request for a "full hearing" was untimely. According to the state, a defendant must 
make such an objection "at the time of sentencing" or the matter is waived. (S.B. at 11-
12.) The state relies on Section 76-3-201 and Utah case law to support its position. 
As more fully set forth herein, Weeks timely objected and requested a "foil 
hearing" under the statute in connection with the restitution order. In addition, the trial 
court considered the merits of the matter in denying the request for a "foil hearing." 
Since the trial court addressed the merits of the request, the issue is properly before this 
Court. Inasmuch as the state does not dispute that the trial court failed to provide Weeks 
with a "foil hearing," Weeks respectfully urges this Court to reverse and remand the case 
for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED 
TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 76-3-201. 
A. THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT THE TRIAL COURT FAILED 
TO PROVIDE A "FULL HEARING" ON THE ISSUE OF RESTITUTION; 
RATHER. THE STATE CLAIMS WEEKS DID NOT TIMELY OBJECT TO 
THE MATTER. 
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, during sentencing the trial judge in 
this case ordered Weeks to pay restitution in the amount of $9,104.35. The amount was 
based on double-hearsay statements presented to the trial judge in a presentence 
investigation report. (See Brief of Appellant at 14; see also Presentence Investigation 
Report at 8-10; R. 60:4-5.) 
Weeks objected to the order of restitution and requested a "full hearing" pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e). (Case No. 2830:37; Case No. 3049:41; Case No. 
3239:39; and R. 60.) Thereafter, at a hearing, Weeks challenged the reliability of the 
information allegedly supporting the restitution award, and he requested the opportunity 
to examine the information purportedly supporting the alleged damages in order that he 
may assess its accuracy. (R. 60:5-7.) The trial judge denied Weeks' requests and ruled 
that the restitution award was fair and reasonable. (R. 60:7.) 
The state does not dispute that the trial judge failed to provide Weeks with a "full 
hearing" on the matter, or that the award of restitution was based on double-hearsay 
statements. Indeed, the state acknowledges that a defendant's due process rights and , 
statutory rights are protected so long as "defendant has the opportunity to examine and 
challenge the information on which his sentence is based." (S.B. at 10.) In this case, the 
trial court denied Weeks such an opportunity, thereby violating his due process and 
statutory rights. 
While the state does not take issue with the merits of Weeks' claims, the state 
challenges the procedural posture of the matter. Specifically, the state asserts that 
Weeks' statutory and due process rights were not violated in this case where Weeks 
"neither requested a restitution hearing nor challenged the factual basis of the trial court's 
restitution order at the time of sentencing." (S.B. at 11.) According to the state, "any 
defendant who wishes to challenge a trial court's restitution order must make his 
objection known at the time he is sentenced in order to preserve his right to a full hearing 
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on the issue." (S.B. at 11.) The state asserts this Court should decline to reach the merits 
of Weeks' issue on appeal on the basis that Weeks "waived his right to a restitution 
hearing" when he filed an objection and requested the hearing 11 days after sentencing. 
(S.B. at 11.) 
The state's argument is unpersuasive for at least three reasons: First, the trial 
judge in this matter considered the merits of Weeks' request for a "full hearing" and 
denied the request on the grounds that the restitution award was fair and reasonable. 
Under those circumstances this Court will not find waiver, but will consider the merits of 
the issue on appeal. Second, Section 76-3-201 does not provide that a defendant who 
fails to object to the imposition of or amount in restitution "at the time of sentencing" has 
waived his right to a "full hearing." In the event this Court interprets the statute in such a 
manner, the interpretation may present an unworkable approach to sentencing 
proceedings that conflicts with due process considerations. Third, the state has cited to 
case law purportedly supporting its interpretation of Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) that failure 
to request a full hearing "at the time of sentencing" constitutes waiver. Those cases do 
not support that position. They support the fundamental proposition that an appellate 
court will not review an issue on appeal where the lower court was not given the 
opportunity first to consider and correct the error. That is not an issue in this case. 
Inasmuch as the state has not disputed the merits of Weeks' claim on appeal, he 
urges this Court to remand the matter for a "full hearing" on the restitution issue. 
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1. This Court Does Not Need to Consider the State's "Waiver" Argument Since 
the Trial Court Considered Weeks' Request for a "Full Hearing" on the Merits. 
On September 10, 1999, the trial judge entered an order of restitution in the 
underlying cases. (See Envelope containing "Documents From Case No. 991902297," 
page 2; Case No. 2830:33-36; Case No. 3239:37-38; Case No. 3049:39-40.) Thereafter, 
on September 21, Weeks objected to the order and requested a "full hearing." (R. Case 
No. 2830:37; Case No. 3239:39; Case No. 3049:41.) 
On October 18, the trial judge held a hearing (R. 60). In disposing of Weeks' 
objection and request, the trial judge "did not rely on waiver, but addressed the merits of 
the issue." State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991). That is, the judge 
considered argument from counsel, described his calculation for the restitution amount, 
acknowledged relying on statements in the presentence investigation report in making his 
determination, and refused to allow Weeks the opportunity to consider or examine the 
factual basis for the restitution award. (R. 60.) The judge also ruled that the amount in 
restitution was "fair and reasonable." (R. 60.) 
Where the trial judge has addressed the issues fully and has not relied on waiver, 
"we consider the issue on appeal" — even if trial counsel arguably failed to properly 
preserve the issue. Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1161. 
One of the primary reasons for imposing waiver rules like rule 103(a)(1) is to 
assure that the trial court has the first opportunity to address a claim that it erred. 
If the trial court already has had that opportunity, the justification for rigid waiver 
requirements is weakened considerably. 
5 
Id 
In the underlying cases in this matter, the trial court gave no indication that it had 
considered rejecting, or would reject, Weeks' objections and request for a full hearing on 
the grounds that the motion was untimely or that Weeks waived such a request. (See R. 
60 generally.) Thus, the problem with the state's waiver argument is that whatever the 
alleged requirements of Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e), the trial judge chose not to treat Weeks' 
alleged failure to raise the issue "at the time of sentencing" as a waiver. "Instead, he 
proceeded to consider the claim. Therefore, the objection was preserved for appeal. The 
judge effectively waived the requirements of [the rule.]" State v. Matsamas. 808 P.2d 
1048, 1053 (Utah 1991); State v. Belgard. 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992); State v. 
Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993) (court's consideration of the merits of the matter -
rather than finding waiver - ensures defendant's right to taive the merits of the issue 
reviewed on appeal). Contrary to the state's assertion, this Court may consider the merits 
of the issue on appeal and reverse the matter for a "full hearing" in accordance with 
Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e). 
2. The Statute Does Not Provide that if Defendant Fails to Object to the 
Restitution Amount at the Time of Sentencing, He Has Waived the Matter. 
According to the state, if defendant fails to object to the restitution order "at the 
time of sentencing," he waives his right to a "full hearing." (S.B. at 11.) In support of 
that position, the state relies on Section 76-3-20l(4)(e), which provides the following: "If 
a defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court 
6 
shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (Supp. 1998). The state seems to argue that the phrase "at 
the time of sentencing" relates to the timing of defendant's objection. Yet, it does not. 
Indeed, the provision is silent with respect to when defendant must object, and it in no 
way suggests that a failure to object "at the time of sentencing" constitutes waiver. 
The phrase "at the time of sentencing" seems to relate to the trial court. That is, 
Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) requires the trial court to provide a "full hearing" once defendant 
objects to the imposition or amount in restitution. While the statute may be construed to 
require the trial court to provide a "full hearing" on the matter "at the time of 
sentencing," such a requirement would be impractical and problematic. 
Consider the manner in which trial courts proceed with sentencing, and the 
requirements of a "full hearing." 
On the one hand, a "full hearing" contemplates fairness, and that a defendant will 
have the opportunity to present evidence in the form of documents, and/or testimony 
from witnesses, and to examine and challenge the accuracy of the factual information 
upon which sentencing determinations are made. See State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712 
(Utah App. 1992) ("full hearing" contemplates opportunity for defendant to present 
evidence as well as examine state evidence). The "full hearing" accommodates due 
process at sentencing, where criminal proceedings must be conducted to ensure that the 
decision-making process is based upon accurate and reliable information. State v. 
7 
Gomez. 887 P.2d 853, 854-55 (Utah 1994); State v. Johnson.. 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 
1993) (cites omitted); State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) (Article 1, Section 
7 of Utah Constitution requires sentencing judge to act on reliable, relevant information 
in exercising discretion in sentencing); State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248-49 (Utah 
1980); see also State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982) (court must interpret 
statutory provisions to be consistent with constitutional safeguards); State v. Patience, 
944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah App. 1997). It contemplates that defendant will have the 
opportunity to investigate his objections to the restitution order. 
On the other hand, in accordance with the practice in this state, restitution is 
imposed at the time of sentencing. (See Envelope containing "Documents From Case 
No. 991902297," page 2; R. Case No. 3239:37-38; Case No. 2830:33-36; Case No. 
3049:39:40.) Thus, an objection to the imposition of or amount in restitution may 
become an issue only after sentencing. That is, a defendant cannot be expected to object 
to restitution unless and until it is imposed against him. Once it is imposed at sentencing, 
it is reasonable to allow counsel the opportunity to investigate the matter to determine 
whether the amount is objectionable. See Utah R. Prof. Cond. 3.1 (2000) (a lawyer shall 
not bring or defend a proceeding or assert or controvert an issue unless there is a basis 
that is not frivolous); see also Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1028 n. 9 (Utah 1996) 
(in determining the amount in restitution, the Board of Pardons and Parole would hold a 
hearing after providing appropriate notice to defendant and access to investigative 
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materials for presentation of evidence). 
Thus, if this Court were to construe the statute to provide a defendant with a "foil 
hearing" on restitution only "at the time of sentencing," such an interpretation would be 
unreasonable, burdensome, and excessive. It would require the parties and court to 
anticipate a foil evidentiary hearing at every sentencing, without knowing in advance 
how the trial court intended to calculate restitution, the basis for the order, or the amount 
the trial court intended to impose. Defendant would not have the ability to investigate 
the matter and to assess the evidentiary issues to be addressed. Rather, in anticipation of 
every possible challenge to what may be ordered, the defendant and state would have to 
arrange the attendance of witnesses and victims even before it is known whether the trial 
judge intended to impose restitution and in what amount. 
Such an interpretation would disrupt and congest the system as well as impose an 
undue burden on victims and other third-party witnesses. In the event the trial court 
determined not to impose restitution, or imposed it in an amount that was not 
objectionable, the disruption would prove to be a waste of time for those who came 
prepared to testify on the chance that a "foil hearing" would be necessary to the matter. 
That is not a reasonable interpretation of Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e). 
Rather, a more reasoned interpretation of the provision would require this Court to 
consider the language of the Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) in light of its purpose. That is, the 
phrase "at the time of sentencing" relates to the timing of the trial court's notice 
9 
concerning the "full hearing." The provision ensures that the trial court will provide 
notice "at the time of sentencing" that a full hearing will be allowed. The phrase 
provides an assurance to defendant of no undue or unreasoneible delay in allowing the 
"full hearing." Thus, when a defendant objects to restitution, the trial court shall provide 
notice to the defendant at the time of sentence that it will hold the "full hearing" on the 
issue. Under that interpretation, the phrase "at the time of sentencing" emphasizes the 
importance of the matter to the trial court in scheduling it without undue delay. 
Such an interpretation would identify the importance of that phrase and the fact 
that it is directed to the trial court. If the defendant objected postorder, after an 
investigation into the matter, the trial court would not be required to provide notice of the 
full hearing "at the time of sentencing," but would be required to provide notice of the 
"full hearing" on the matter within a reasonable time of defendant's objection. 
That interpretation of Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) would be consistent with treatment 
of other sentencing statutes. In State v. Helm. 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-1 (1953 as amended). The statute 
provided that after a guilty verdict, "the court must appoint a time for pronouncing 
judgment, which must be at least two days and not more than ten days after the verdict." 
Id. at 797 (quoting § 77-35-1) (emphasis added). The defendant in Helm argued that the 
trial court's failure to pronounce sentence within the time mandated by the statute 
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the matter. Id_at 797. The supreme court 
disagreed and construed the language of the statute as follows: 
10 
[This] statute should be viewed in harmony with the general rule of statutory 
construction: that it should be interpreted and applied in light of its purpose. That 
purpose was that there should be no undue or [unreasonable] delay in the 
pronouncement of the sentence, particularly that there should be no imposition of 
hardship on the defendant or prejudicial effect upon his rights. Consistent with 
what has been said, we think the view which is sound and which comports with 
the requirements of justice is that the limits so prescribed in the statute are not 
mandatory and jurisdictional, but are directory; and that where the sentence is 
imposed within a reasonable time so that there is no abuse of the court's power 
nor adverse effects upon the defendant, he should not be entitled to go free, but 
should be entitled to have the correct sentence imposed upon him, with due 
consideration given to any time he may have served because of the delay. 
Id at 797 (footnote omitted). 
In this matter, Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) should not be construed as a bar against the 
defendant in objecting to the order of restitution so long as defendant's objection is made 
within a reasonable time. Indeed, the statute does not specify that a defendant has waived 
his right to such a full hearing "by failing to request it at the time of sentencing." (S.B. at 
11.) Further, while nothing in the record suggests that Weeks' objection to restitution 11 
days after sentencing had any adverse effect on the court, the state, or the victims, the 
failure to provide the "full hearing" adversely affected Weeks' due process rights. See 
State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982) (court must interpret statutory 
provisions to avoid potential constitutional conflicts); State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 
(Utah 1985) (Article 1, Section 7 of Utah Constitution requires sentencing judge to act 
on reliable, relevant information in exercising discretion in sentencing); Lipsky, 608 P.2d 
at 1248-49; see also Casarez. 656 P.2d at 1007; State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 389 
(UtahApp. 1997). 
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The provision should be construed to mean that when a defendant requests a "full 
hearing/' there should be no undue or unreasonable delay in the process; there should be 
no imposition of hardship on the defendant or victims, or prejudicial effect upon 
defendant's rights. The provision is not mandatory but directory in terms of the timing, 
and where a request for a "fiill hearing" is made within a reasonable time of the 
imposition of restitution, defendant shall be entitled to such a hearing within a reasonable 
time with due consideration given to the need to investigate the matter and to present and 
examine evidence. 
Finally, to the extent this Court determines that Weeks' request was untimely 
under Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e), this Court may disregard the form of the request for its 
substance to find that the rules of criminal procedure accommodate the request for a "full 
hearing" where a defendant may request at any time that a trial court correct an illegal 
sentence. _See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2000). 
In this case, an illegal sentence was issued where the trial court imposed 
restitution based on double-hearsay statements. (See Brief of Appellant at 8-20.) Such 
statements "cannot stand alone as the basis for sentencing." Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1071. 
Also, Weeks was not allowed to examine the information purportedly supporting the 
restitution amount. Such information should have been made available to Weeks in 
connection with an evidentiary hearing on the matter where he would have the 
opportunity to consider the basis for the award and challenge the accuracy of the amount. 
That is consistent with the requests made in this case. 
12 
Since a motion to correct an illegal sentence may be made at any time, see State v. 
Lee Lim, 7 P.2d 825, 826 (Utah 1932) (a district court may reassume jurisdiction to 
correct sentence), it may serve as an appropriate method for requesting the hearing in this 
matter. 
For the reasons set forth herein, Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) should not be construed as 
a rule of limitations against defendant, and should not serve to bar objections brought 
within a reasonable period of time. 
3. The Cases Relied Upon by the State Do Not Support the Determination that a 
Defendant Who Fails to Object "at the Time of Sentencing," Has Waived his 
Right to a "Full Hearing." 
The state has cited to Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1029 (Utah 1996), and 
State v. Snvder, 747 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1987), for the proposition that a defendant must 
make his objection to restitution "at the time he is sentenced in order to preserve his right 
to a full hearing on the issue." (S.B. at ll.)1 Those cases do not stand for that 
proposition. 
Indeed, consideration of Monson supports the determination that defendant may 
be allowed a "full hearing" on the issue of restitution even where defendant failed to 
make such a request to the tribunal that issued the restitution order. 
In that case, the Board of Pardons and Parole held a hearing in November 1992 
l The state also has relied on State v. Haga. 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah App. 1998). That 
case supports the determination that a defendant who requests a "full hearing" is entitled 
to such. 
13 
concerning Monson's parole. Thereafter, the Board issued a formal order granting a 
parole date and imposing parole conditions, which in part required Monson to "pay 
restitution in an amount to be determined." Monson, 928 P.2d at 1021. Monson did not 
object to the order and he did not request that the Board hold a hearing on the matter. 
Monson, 928 P.2d at 1029. Rather, in January 1993, Monson filed a pro se petition with 
the district court, and in November 1993, with the assistance of counsel, Monson filed an 
amended petition for extraordinary relief alleging among other things that the Board 
failed to comply with Utah statutory law in ordering restitution. Li. at 1021, 1029. 
Monson relied on Section 76-3-201, and claimed that the Board failed to consider 
mandatory statutory factors in ordering restitution, and it denied him a "full hearing" on 
the matter as permitted by § 76-3-20l(4)(e). See Monson, 928 P.2d at 1028-29. 
The supreme court agreed with Monson on the first point: "The record in this case 
does not demonstrate that the Board considered the statutory factors because it does not 
contain any explanation of the reasons the Board ordered Monson to pay restitution." Id. 
at 1028. The supreme court remanded the case to the trial court with orders that the 
Board must give an explanation of its restitution order taking into account the statutory 
factors. "In so doing, the Board will no doubt determine the amount of restitution to be 
ordered." Id. 
In considering Monson's second point, the supreme court ruled there was no error 
in failing to provide a "full hearing" since Monson never made an objection to the Board 
or requested the hearing. Rather, Monson filed a petition with the trial court. Id. at 
14 
1029. The supreme court's ruling in that regard was consistent with the fundamental 
principle that an appellate court will not find error if defendant has failed to allow the 
trial court the opportunity to address the matter in the first instance. 
In making that determination, the supreme court did not indicate that Monson had 
lost all rights to a "full hearing" on the matter for failing to object in connection with the 
Board proceedings. Rather, in order to accommodate the statute and Monson's due 
process rights, the court stated that Monson would be entitled to a "full hearing" when 
the Board specified an amount in restitution. Id. Thus, it seems Monson would be 
allowed the "full hearing," where the restitution issue was remanded on the first point 
and it was expected that the Board would determine the amount of restitution. Id. at 
1028-29. 
In Monson, defendant failed to request a "full hearing" with the Board, as he 
should have. Yet, that did not deprive Monson of the right to such a hearing. In 
addition, the supreme court did not construe Section 76-3-20l(4)(e) to bar Monson's 
right to a "full hearing" based on his failure to object in connection with the Board 
proceedings. This Court likewise should not construe the statute in such a manner. 
Next, in Snyder, 747 P.2d at 421, after the trial court ordered defendant to pay 
restitution, defendant failed to lodge any objection to the imposition, amount, or 
distribution of the restitution ordered. Id_ Thus, in accordance with fundamental legal 
principles, the Utah Supreme Court determined that defendant waived his right to 
challenge the order of restitution. IdL The court did not consider the timing of the 
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objection in the trial court for purposes of a "full hearing." 
In this case, Weeks made a request for a "full hearing" within a reasonable time of 
the trial court's order on restitution. The trial court failed to allow a "full hearing." The 
appropriate remedy here is to remand the case and to order the trial court to give Weeks a 
"full hearing" on the matter. See Monson. 928 P.2d at 1028-29. 
B. WEEKS' CLAIM CONCERNING THE FACTORS SET FORTH AT 
SECTION 76-3-20If8Vc) IS GOVERNED BY MONSON AND ROBERTSON. 
In response to Weeks' claim that the trial judge failed to take into consideration 
the factors set forth at Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c) (Brief of Appellant at 17-20), the state 
again asserts that Weeks failed to timely object to the trial court's order and/or Weeks 
waived the issue on appeal. In addition, the state asserts that the trial court complied 
with the statute in issuing the restitution order. The state disregards relevant case law on 
the matter in making its assertions, as set forth below. 
1. The Statutory Law and Case Law Provide that the Trial Court Must Make 
Explicit Findings in the Record with Regard to the Statutory Factors in Ordering 
Restitution. 
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c) provides 
that the court must consider the following factors in determining restitution: (1) The 
defendant's financial resources and the burden that restitution will impose on defendant's 
other obligations; (2) The defendant's ability to pay restitution; (3) The rehabilitative 
effect on the defendant of restitution payments; and (4) Other circumstances which make 
restitution inappropriate. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(c) (Supp. 1998). Also, "[if] the 
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court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the 
court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i) (Supp 1998). 
Utah case law supports the determination that explicit consideration of the above 
factors is mandatory, and must be set forth in the record. 
As set forth above (point A.3., supra), in Monson v. Carver, the Board of Pardons 
and Parole issued an order fixing defendant's parole date and imposing conditions on 
parole. The Board ordered Monson to pay restitution in an amount to be determined. 
Monson, 928 P.2d at 1021. Monson did not object to the Board's ruling. Monson, 928 
P.2d at 1029. Rather, he filed a petition for extraordinary relief with the trial court and 
alleged that the Board "failed to comply with certain procedural requirements when it 
ordered restitution." IdLat 1021. The trial court rejected Monson's claims. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court considered provisions set forth at § 76-3-201, 
which require the trial court to take into account the four specific factors in assessing 
restitution, and recognized that according to the statute, if restitution is ordered the trial 
court "shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record." Monson, 928 
P.2d at 1028.2 The supreme court reversed and remanded the case in order that the Board 
2 The statutory provisions at § 76-3-201 have been renumbered. In prior Utah case law, 
the four statutory factors appeared at Section 76-3-201(4)(c), and the provision requiring 
the trial court to "make the reasons for the [restitution] decision a part of the court 
record" appeared at Section 76-3-201(4)(d). In 1999, when Weeks was sentenced, the 
four statutory factors appeared at Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c). That subsection is 
incorporated by reference into subsection (4), which requires the trial court to determine 
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could "comply with the statute by giving Monson an explanation of its decision which 
demonstrates that it has taken into account the appropriate statutory factors." IdLat 1028-
29. 
In State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219, 1233-34 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme 
Court again considered the statutory requirements imposed on the trial court in assessing 
restitution. Id In that case, the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution for costs 
incurred in connection with extradition. Defendant appealed the order on the basis that 
the trial court failed to consider "his financial history and impecunious status" as 
required under Section 76-3-20l(4)(c). See note 2, supra. The supreme court reiterated 
that according to the statute,"before ordering restitution, the court must take into account 
the financial resources of defendant. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-20 l(4)(c)(i), 77-32a-3. 
Moreover, when the court determines whether restitution of extradition costs is 
appropriate, 'the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record.' 
Id. § 76-3-201(4)(d)(i)." Id at 1234 (footnote omitted). 
The supreme court found that the trial court in that matter failed to make the 
appropriate findings in connection with the restitution of extradition costs. The court 
declined to infer such findings from the record: 
Although the trial judge did not specifically state that he considered Robertson's 
financial condition in ordering restitution, as a general rule, "this court upholds 
restitution "as provided in Subsection (8)." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(c) (Supp. 
1998). Also, according to subsection (4)(d), the trial court "shall make the reasons for the 
decision a part of the court record." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(d) (Supp. 1998). 
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the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would 
be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings." Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 788 n.6 (Utah 1991). As we discussed above, there are limited instances 
in which this assumption should not be made: when an ambiguity of the facts 
makes the assumption unreasonable, id. at 788, if the statute explicitly provides 
that written findings must be made, Labrum, 925 P.2d at 939-40, or when a prior 
case states that findings on a particular issue must be made to impress upon the 
trial court the importance of the issue so as to ensure that we can properly perform 
our appellate review function, see Nelson, 725 P.2d at 1356 n. 3. [Imposing] of 
restitution of extradition costs falls under the Labrum exception. 
Id. at 1234 (bold emphasis added). 
According to Robertson and pursuant to Subsections 76-3-201(8)(c) and (4)(d), in 
considering the four factors relevant to imposition of restitution "the trial court must take 
the additional step of explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the decision it 
reached, reflecting the detailed factors listed in the statute." Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234. 
In Weeks' case, the state admits that in connection with ordering restitution, the 
trial court did not "specifically address[] its reasons for restitution." (S.B. at 18); see 
Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234 (where trial court "did not discuss on the record the reasons 
for ordering restitution of extradition costs" the matter would be vacated and remanded 
for further proceedings). Indeed, the order of restitution here appears almost as an 
afterthought, where the trial judge simply stated, "And I will further order that you pay 
restitution in the amount of $9,104.35, that you pay a recoupment fee for the use of your 
publicly provided lawyer of $250, and I will recommend while you're there that you 
receive substance abuse therapy." (R. 70:Tab 2:10.) 
Nevertheless, the state asserts the following statement made by the judge reflects 
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consideration of the factors: "There's no mystery about the fact that I'm going to 
obviously commit you to prison, which is probably where you need to be, at least until 
you get your head on straight. You've taken now since you were 14 to develop this style 
of living, it's going to take you a while to undevelop it." (R. 70:Tab 2:9.) Those state-
ments relate to the fact that the judge intended to send Weeks to prison for the crimes. 
The state also suggests that the "additional step of explicitly noting on the record 
the reasons for the [restitution] decision," Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234, may be inferred 
from the fact that the presentence investigation report contained information relating to 
Weeks' dismal job history. (S.B. 19-20.) The report reflects that as a juvenile, Weeks 
held five separate jobs for short periods of time that paid from 25 cents per delivery to 
$5.50 an hour. With respect to each job, Weeks was employed for a few months and 
then was fired or quit. Also, Weeks was "kicked out" of his parents' home at age 13, he 
believed the "highest grade he actually completed was the eighth," he was ordered to pay 
restitution in several other cases, and he presently had no income or assets. (Presentence 
Investigation Report, dated 5-30-99, at 9-11, 13-17.) 
It is not clear whether, or to what extent, the trial court took into account Weeks' 
lack of financial resources, his inability to pay, or the other court-ordered financial 
obligations set forth in the presentence investigation report, in ordering restitution in the 
amount of $9,104.35. The trial court's failure to comply with the statutory requirements 
and case law compels reversal of this matter and remand for further proceedings. 
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2. The Analysis Set Forth in Monson and Robertson/Labrum Supports Review of 
This Issue Under the Plain-Error Doctrine. 
The state claims that in the lower court, Weeks did not properly preserve his claim 
that the court failed to comply with Subsections 76-3-20 l(8)(c) and (4)(d) in ordering 
restitution. (S.B. at 15-16.) Yet, Weeks objected to the imposition of restitution pursuant 
to § 76-3-201. (Case No. 2830:37; Case No. 3049:41; Case No. 3239:39; andR. 60.) 
Weeks requested a restitution hearing on the matter, which should have been provided to 
accommodate consideration of the factors set forth in § 76-3-20 l(8)(c). The issue was 
properly preserved for purposes of appeal. 
The error was plain and obvious. In the alternative, Weeks asserts that this Court 
may review the trial court's failure to consider the statutory factors under the plain-error 
doctrine. (Brief of Appellant at 19 n. 5.) The state disputes application of that doctrine 
on the basis that the error was not obvious: "Here, neither statute nor case law requires 
the trial court to make specific findings on defendant's financial condition before 
ordering restitution." (S.B. at 17.) The state is incorrect. The statute mandates that the 
trial court "make the reasons for the [restitution] decision a part of the record" at the time 
that it orders restitution. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(d). 
Likewise, Utah case law in effect at the time of sentencing in this case provided 
that "the trial court must take the additional step of explicitly noting on the record the 
reasons for the [restitution] decision it reached, reflecting the detailed factors listed in the 
statute," Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234, including (1) the defendant's financial resources 
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and the burden that restitution will impose on defendant's other obligations; (2) 
defendant's ability to pay restitution; (3) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of 
restitution payments; and (4) other circumstances which make restitution inappropriate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(8)(c) (Supp. 1998). 
Furthermore, in Monson, although defendant did not object when the Board 
failed to consider the four statutory factors, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the issue 
on the merits and reversed the matter for further proceedings. Monson, 928 P.2d at 
1028-29. The supreme court found that "[the] record in this case does not demonstrate 
that the Board considered the statutory factors because it does not contain any 
explanation of the reasons the Board ordered Monson to pay restitution." Monson, 928 
P.2d at 1028. The record in Weeks' case likewise is silent on the matter. 
Finally, the supreme court's discussion of the issue in Robertson relies on State v. 
Labrum, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996), for support. In Labrum, the Utah Supreme Court 
ruled that where a statute requires a trial court to make specific findings on the record in 
connection with a ruling, the trial court's failure to comply with the plain language of the 
statute constitutes plain and obvious error. Id.at 940-41.3 In Robertson, the supreme 
court recognized that the language of the Utah restitution statute is plain: the trial court 
must explicitly note on the record its reasons for ordering restitution, taking into 
consideration the four statutory factors. Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234. Thus, where the 
3 Weeks does not claim that the trial court was required to make written findings. 
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requirement is explicit in the statute, Robertson and Labrum support application of the 
plain-error analysis to find that the trial court obviously erred in failing to comply with 
the statute. See Labrum, 925 P.2d at 940-41; Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234. 
The error was prejudicial. The state does not dispute that Weeks suffered 
prejudice under the plain-error doctrine. Indeed, because the trial court failed to take the 
factors into consideration in ordering restitution in the amount of $9,104.35, there is no 
assurance that imposition of restitution was appropriate in this case. 
In accordance with Robertson and Monson, "the appropriate remedy" is to order 
the trial court to comply with the statutory provisions of Section 76-3-201, "by giving 
[defendant] an explanation of its decision which demonstrates that it has taken into 
account the appropriate statutory factors." Monson, 928 P.2d at 1028. Weeks 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse and remand the matter for further 
proceedings consistent with the statutory mandates of Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c) and (4)(d). 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, Weeks was entitled to a "full hearing" on the issue of restitution, and 
to a review of the information underlying the alleged restitution amount. In addition, 
Weeks was entitled to have the trial court consider the factors set forth in § 76-3-
201(8)(c) in assessing restitution. Weeks respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
restitution award since it is based on unreliable information, or in the alternative, vacate 
the order and remand the case for a "full hearing" and/or appropriate findings. 
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